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1. Executive Summary 
 
Social Impact Bonds (SIBs) represent a new and innovative tool for promoting social welfare. If 
implemented correctly, they could represent a new frontier for public-private partnerships and 
philanthropic-private contracts. The limitations on the private provisioning of social welfare 
programs are decreasing, and recent technology allows for more accurate cost-benefit analysis 
and the measurement of more meaningful performance indicators. Taken together, these factors 
increase the technical feasibility of SIBs.  
 
By incorporating the private sector into the promotion of social welfare, social programs stand to 
benefit from the market-driven efficiencies gained by incorporating a profit motive. Society 
stands to benefit in return, through both the more effective provision of social services and the 
cost savings realized by government entities. This situation is made possible when we take an 
“outcomes-oriented” approach to social programs, where the goal of government is not to control 
the method by which services are provided, but rather the actual results of such interventions. A 
results-focused approach has created space for experimentation in the provision of social services 
and created opportunities for all stakeholders (private investors, governments, philanthropic 
organizations, non-profits, target populations, and intermediaries) to benefit from this new 
investment frontier. 
 
This policy analysis describes in detail the risks and barriers that could prevent the growth of the 
SIB market and hinder its adoption as a useful means of providing social services. We identify 
eight key investor risks:  
• Execution 
• Intermediary 








and four barriers to scale:  
• Transaction costs 
• Availability of capital  
• Deal flow availability  
• Availability of service providers 
All of the above risks and barriers must be addressed in order for the SIB market to grow. 
However, through this analysis we have determined that transaction costs are the greatest 
impediment to success. These costs are mainly attributed to the customization inherent in the 
current SIB market, whereby each SIB project must be individually structured, negotiated, and 
managed. The following analysis examines three alternative financial models with properties that 
decrease transaction costs, including bundled Clean Development Mechanisms (CDM), 
structured financial instruments, and social impact private equity funds, to see which elements of 
their construction could be useful in scaling the SIB market.  
Through our analysis, we have determined that intermediaries and policymakers should attempt 
to scale the SIB market using a private equity intermediary model. This model requires the 
fewest number of regulatory and policy changes to be successful and results in the organic 
growth of the SIB market. Financial investors stand to gain through effective risk diversification, 
and intermediaries benefit as they increase their internal capacity to evaluate the risks in 
implementing social programs. This growth in assessment capabilities decreases the dependency 
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on governments and other types of specialized intermediaries, thereby decreasing the overall 






The Social Impact Bond (SIB) is a new and innovative model that leverages market-driven 
efficiencies to provide social services. Despite widespread enthusiasm for SIBs, the question of 
how the market can expand remains open. Examining existing financial instruments can provide 
insights into how SIBs can scale. 
 
A SIB is a contractual arrangement between an entity with a mandate to promote social welfare 
(e.g., governments, development banks, and philanthropic organizations) and a private sector 
investor that will finance social service interventions up front in exchange for future payouts. 
The amount of the payout level is linked to the resulting effectiveness of the social service.  
 
The SIB model is known by multiple names, which has led to some confusion about what SIBs 
are. They have alternately been referred to as developmental impact bonds (DIBs), performance-
based contracts, pay-for-performance (p4p), pay-for-outcomes, outcomes financing, pay-for-
success, and smart contracts.  
 
While the name of the model can change in a given context, the underlying principle is the same.  
In the most common SIB structure, government-to-private-sector contract, the potential payment 
is often determined as a percentage of the expected cost savings the government will see from 
the decline in social services usage. As an example, many SIBs are targeted toward decreasing 
recidivism rates due to the costly nature of incarceration. The two payment styles used either pay 
for improvements at a population level (Figure 1) or on a per-individual-served basis, called a 
rate-card model (Figure 2). Population level payments are considered to have a more rigorous 
study design, meaning that they contain a control group of individuals who did not receive the 
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social service but are otherwise identical to those who did. This allows for a direct comparison of 
whether the service provider’s efforts were the reason for the improvement. 
 
 
Figure 1: Example of SIB payment agreement based on population improvements 




Figure 2: Example of SIB payment agreement based on a per-individual basis for improving educational 
attainment for homeless youth in the U.K. 
Source: The Potential and Limitations of Impact Bonds: Lessons from the First Five Years of Experience Worldwide, Brookings 
Institute, 2015. 
The potential of the SIB model to provide results-focused social services using market-driven 
efficiency has been met with broad approval across the political spectrum. The first SIB was 
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initially conceived in the United Kingdom under Prime Minister Gordon Brown’s center-left 
Labor party and was implemented by David Cameron’s center-right Conservative party in 2010.1 
In the United States, legislation designed to promote SIB development has bipartisan sponsors in 
both houses of Congress. S. 1089, the Social Impact Partnership Act, is sponsored by Senators 
Orin Hatch (R-Utah) and Michael Bennet (D-Col.); its counterpart H.R. 1336 is sponsored by 
House Representatives Todd Young (R-Ind.) and John Delaney (D-Md.) 
 
The structure of a SIB can vary from contract to contract. The Harvard Kennedy School’s Social 
Impact Bond Technical Assistance Lab considers the basic structure to require the participation 
of four entities (Figure 3):  
 
1. Government (outcomes payer) – The outcomes payer is the entity that both sets the pay 
scale and defines what outcomes will be measured. So far, most SIB contracts have 
involved programs targeting criminal justice, education, employment, and welfare (e.g., 
decreasing homelessness).  
2. Private funders (up-front capital) – Private funders are expected to put up the initial 
capital needed for the intermediary and service provider to implement an 
intervention/program expected to be effective at achieving the outcomes agreed upon in 
the contract. 
3. Intermediary (clearinghouse & organizer) – There are multiple roles for intermediaries 
to play, and in some SIB constructions these roles are provided by separate entities. 
Intermediaries are needed to amass funds from investors, vet service providers and 
                                                
1 Liang, M., B. Mansberger, and A.C. Spieler, An overview of social impact bonds. Journal of International Business & Law, 
2014. 13(2): p. 267-281. 
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supply them with working capital, and contribute performance management expertise to 
ensure the SIB contract’s success. 
4. Service providers (implementer) – The service provider is the entity responsible for 
executing either their own social program or a social program provided to them. They are 
overseen by an intermediary tasked with data acquisition and program evaluation (to 
analyze the service provider’s ongoing performance).  
 
Figure 3: Social Impact Bond Structure. 
Source: Social Impact Bonds: A Guide for State and Local Governments, 2013. 
 
The design and implementation of a SIB contract has proven complex in practice. The first SIB 
contract signed in the U.S. involved coordination across seven different entities (Figure 4). This, 
in conjunction with the U.K. government’s alteration of its SIB pilot in Peterborough2 and the 
high-profile negative result of Goldman Sachs’ initial Rikers Island SIB,3 has made some 
observers skeptical as to whether SIBs can scale in a meaningful way to reach a size that would 
                                                
2 Social Finance, At Work: Finance & IT - Social Finance - Has the social investment flagship sailed off course? Third Sector, 
2014: p. 19. 
3 Paul, B., No Success Like Failure: N.Y. Sees Social Impact Bond Pluses. (Regional News). The Bond Buyer, 2015. 1(34337). 
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attract traditional investors.4 Others argue against SIBs by averring that the major cost advantage 
of SIB contracts is the decrease in labor costs for contract workers over government employees, 
and that the outsourcing of welfare programs is just a transitional step toward government 
defunding of social services.5  
 
Figure 4: SIB contract partners to decrease youth recidivism rates at Rikers Island. Source: mdrc: 
http://www.mdrc.org/key-partners-nycs-social-impact-bond  
 
Despite the setbacks and critiques, the SIB model has achieved several milestones since 2010. 
The U.K. has recently offered its first SIB to retail investors.6 In the U.S., Utah became the first 
state to pay for a successful educational intervention.7 Finally, the Children’s Investment Fund 
                                                
4 Arena, M. et al., Social Impact Bonds: Blockbuster or Flash in a Pan? International Journal of Public Administration, 2016: p. 
1-13. 
5 McHugh, N., Social impact bonds: a wolf in sheep's clothing? Journal of Poverty and Social Justice, 2013. 21(3): p. 247-257.	  
6 Johnson, S., First social impact retail bond launched. (FT REPORT - FUND MANAGEMENT). 2013. p. 1. 
7 Williamson, R., Goldman Sachs Social Impact Bond Pays Off in Utah. 2015: New York, N.Y. 
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Foundation became the first non-government outcomes funder when it signed a DIB [SIB] 
contract designed to increase the educational attainment of girls in Rajasthan, India.8  
 
The future growth rate and structure of the SIB market remain open questions. The purpose of 
this analysis is to explore the existing risks and barriers that prevent SIBs from becoming widely 
used to achieve societal welfare gains. Once we identify the risks and barriers, we examine other 




                                                




3. Analysis Methodology 
 
The methodology used in this analysis included reviews of primary literature, semi-structured 
interviews with experts and representative stakeholders, and a secondary analysis of reported 
survey information included in the July 2015 Brookings Report on the potential and limitations 
of SIBs.  
 
The primary literature review was conducted through several sources. We utilized Harvard 
Library’s Hollis+ search engine, performing indexed word searches for “social impact bond,” 
“SIB,” “development impact bond,” and “DIB,” with date boundaries set between 2010 and the 
present. Several institutional websites with a known interest in SIB financing were also assessed: 
the Center for Global Development, the Brookings Institute, Social Finance, Third Sector 
Capital, and the Harvard Kennedy School Government (HKS) Performance Lab.   
 
The market analysis was informed by Instiglio’s Impact Bonds Worldwide Resource 
(http://www.instiglio.org/en/sibs-worldwide/), the Brookings Institute’s review of existing social 
impact bonds, and the HKS Government Performance Lab’s projects database 
(http://govlab.hks.harvard.edu/our-projects).  
 
Semi-structured interviews with experts and stakeholders were conducted under the direction of 
the Director of the HKS Government Performance Lab, Professor Jeffrey Liebman. These 
interviews provided additional insights on risks and barriers to scale as well as the feasibility of 
proposed financial products. A list of standard questions posed to interviewees is included in 




4. Market landscape 
 
The social impact bond market has grown significantly in the five years since the implementation 
of the first SIB in 2010. Its growth has been particularly strong in the past two years: during this 
time, the number of implemented SIBs has tripled to reach over 50 projects in more than a dozen 
countries around the world. This chapter provides an overview of the existing SIBs, their areas 
of focus, and their capital structures and outcome payments.  
 
Overview 
The first SIB, implemented in the U.K. in 2010, was aimed at reducing recidivism rates among 
male prisoners in Peterborough. After a slow start in the early years, the number of deals 
implemented almost tripled between 2013 and 2015; by 2015, over 50 SIBs were implemented 
around the world. Approximately half were located in the UK, where the national government 
plays a very active role, having established a Center for Social Impact Bonds in the Prime 
Minister’s Cabinet Office; the UK’s government-established Innovation Fund and Chance Fund 
are responsible for 17 ongoing projects in employment and social welfare. The U.S. market, the 
second largest player in the field, has so far grown to accommodate seven SIBs. Australia, 
Germany, the Netherlands, Finland, Portugal, Belgium, Canada, Switzerland and Austria have 
also implemented their first SIBs. Numerous other countries including Chile, Colombia, Costa 





                                                
9 Perakis, Rita, “First Development Impact Bond Is Launched”, Center for Global Development, June 2014.	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Country Design stage Implementation stage 
United Kingdom 8 25 
United States 8 11 




Israel 4 1 











































TOTAL 27 52 
Figure 5: Number of SIBs/DIBs worldwide; Source: Instiglio 
Areas of focus 
The earliest SIBs focused primarily on criminal justice. Since then SIBs in employment, 
education, and various aspects of social welfare (adoption, foster care, homelessness, and 
disadvantaged youth) have attracted the most attention and investment. Criminal justice and 
employment have been particularly good starting areas for the development and implementation 
of SIBs, as they offer easily quantifiable, near-term, monetizable outcomes. Moreover, the 
negative consequences of policy failures in these areas are immediately perceived by the 
community, which creates popular pressure and strong incentives for the commissioner to deal 
with the issue. The existing education SIBs focus on access to pre-school education and primary-
school technological supplies for children in disadvantaged areas.  
The area of the SIB can determine its targeted population groups. Education and welfare projects 
tend to focus on children and adolescents, while homelessness and criminal justice programs 
normally work with adults. In summer 2015, the first SIB targeting the wellbeing of the elderly 
was released in the UK’s Worcestershire County.10 Two recent projects in Belgium and 
Switzerland have also focused specifically on the integration of immigrants and asylum seekers 
into local labor markets.11  
 
                                                
10 Keble, Richard, Well Connected Social Impact Bond – Briefing Note, 
http://www.worcestershire.gov.uk/download/downloads/id/3714/well_connected_social_impact_bond_%E2%80%93_briefing_n
ote.pdf. 





Most SIBs have investment structures that combine riskier and more conservative aspects, much 
like debt and equity. All deals, by definition, offer variable repayment and interest based on the 
performance of the project, but many also set caps on returns and have set interest rates for given 
outcomes. The deals in Britain have generally been structured more like equity, while in the U.S. 
debt-like structures are more common. In the US, various SIBs have also been financed by 
layered capital structures, including senior and subordinate investments, grants, or investment 
guarantees. Subordinate investment is repaid after senior investment, which makes it riskier. 
Many deals, especially in the UK, recycle funds by reinvesting early payments by the outcome 
funder back into program operation. The total payments from the outcome funder to the program 
are therefore much greater than what the investor receives. The common use of capital recycling 
in the U.K. also means that the requirements of up-front capital commitments are generally 
lower, as seen in the figure below. The range of capital commitments is fairly large: the smallest 
amount of $148,000 has been committed to the educational impact bond in Lisbon, Portugal, and 
the largest, $16.9 million, to the Child-Parent Center in Chicago. The largest single amount to 
date, $24.5 million, has been committed to a homelessness SIB in Massachusetts, but the vast 
majority of this sum comes in the form of non-recoverable grants.12   
                                                




Figure 6: Capital commitments for selected SIBs; Source: The Potential and Limitations of Impact 
Bonds, 2015, Brookings 
Outcome payments 
All projects establish a maximum potential return to investors, or a maximum payment that the 
outcome funder will be required to pay. The maximum contract values of individual projects 
tend to be below 7.5%, but these vary significantly. For instance, the employment SIB in 
Germany has a maximum average annual return set of 3%, while two family-focused projects in 
New South Wales and Australia set much higher maximum returns: the Newpin Bond could 
deliver up to 15%, and the Benevolent Society up to 10% for senior and 30% for subordinate 
investors. The Newpin Bond, aimed at preventing children from entering out-of-home care, is 
one of the SIBs that has also delivered returns to investors. In its first year, the project restored 
28 children in out-of-home care to their families and prevented children in 10 at-risk families 
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from entering care, delivering a return of 7.5% to their investors, which puts it in the middle of 
the range of possible returns.13 The successful pre-school SIB program in Utah delivered the 
investor an estimated return of 5-7%, while the Innovation Fund in the U.K. announced that at 
least three second-round projects have delivered returns to investors and will be 
recommissioned.14 
  
                                                
13 Australian Centre for Financial Studies (ACFS), Roundtable: The Future of Social Impact Bonds, July 2015, p.5. 
14 Popper Nathaniel, “For Goldman, Success in Social Impact Bond That Aids Schoolchildren”, New York Times , October 2015, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/08/business/for-goldman-success-in-social-impact-bond-that-aids-schoolchildren.html; Ward, 




5. Risks and Barriers to Scale 
 
The following section will identify and define the eight key investor risks present in SIBs and the 
four main barriers to scale for the SIB market. 
Investor risks 
Operational risk: Operational risk can be subdivided into two categories: execution risk and 
intermediary risk. 
Execution (Service Provider) Risk: Execution risk can be defined as a principle-agent risk 
between the financial intermediary and the hired service provider. Even after an intervention or 
service delivery model has been found to be effective, there is a risk that the chosen service 
provider is ill-equipped to implement it correctly. While the reason for this risk could be from a 
service provider willfully exploiting the asymmetry of information – knowing that they are not 
capable of implementing the program – this risk is more likely to be a product of poor internal 
operations and performance management. This indicates that financial intermediaries and private 
funders can see greater benefits when they take a hands-on approach to working with providers. 
 
Intermediary risk: Given the central role of the intermediary in the SIB structure, it can very 
easily become a bottleneck and undermine a project’s social and financial goals. With the 
differentiated and evolving structure of SIBs, responsibilities of the intermediary are multi-
faceted and constantly changing. Some intermediaries might simply not be capable of managing 
and coordinating the complex networks and long list of duties and responsibilities. Since the SIB 
market itself is relatively new, there is no established intermediary with a great track record and 
years of experience, and thus intermediary risk is particularly relevant in today’s environment. 
However, with the scaling-up of the market, and through trial-and-error and good due diligence, 
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the intermediary risk will be mitigated. As more experience is accumulated, best practices and 
guidelines for intermediaries, as well as processes for removing or substituting them, will 
emerge.   
 
There is, however, another aspect of the intermediary risk: conflicts of interest. If the 
intermediary’s underlying interests or incentives align with the outcome funder, it could very 
well prioritize those interests over those of the investors. In such cases investors should require 
absolutely transparent monitoring and evaluation processes and rigorously assess the incentives 
and interests of all parties involved. 
 
Government non-payment risk: Government non-payment risk can be defined as the risk that 
the government (or outcome funder) fails to pay the predetermined return to the investor(s) 
following a successful evaluation of achieved outcomes. This risk can be further divided into two 
types of government non-payment risk: 1) government unwillingness to pay and 2) government 
inability to pay. The former refers to the situation in which, due to a change of administration or 
the government’s priorities, the government defunds the social project and therefore chooses to 
break the SIB contract. The latter refers to the situation in which, due to fiscal stress, the 
government loses its ability to fund the project. This risk is particularly acute for DIBs, as many 
of the potential outcome funders could be prone to macroeconomic instability. In addition, the 
existence of currency mismatches, in which DIBs are contracted in foreign currency, could be 
susceptible to currency crises and/or capital controls. This risk is mitigated if the outcome funder 
is an international financial institution, such as the World Bank, rather than a sovereign 




To date, there has been little clarification about the legal recourses investors can take in the case 
of government non-payment of SIBs. In the case of domestically issued SIBs, it is likely that a 
country’s domestic legal system would be used for dispute resolution. However, the lack of 
agreed-upon evaluation metrics and the legal system’s inexperience in resolving these conflicts 
mean that uncertainties exist. For foreign issued DIBs, the legal recourses for investors are even 
less clear. Cross-border investment disputes are usually dealt with in international arbitration 
courts. However, the arbitration process is slow and costly for investors. In addition, even if the 
arbitration court rules in favor of the investor, foreign entities or governments oftentimes still 
refuse to pay, rendering the arbitration ruling irrelevant. Finally, given that the SIB market is in 
its early stages, it is unclear whether DIBs will be covered under bilateral investment treaties 
(BITs) and therefore afforded the same protections and resources from the home country’s 
government.  
 
Systemic risk: Systemic risk can be defined as the myriad of potentially confounding factors that 
are outside of the scope of the specific services provided and can affect the success of the SIB. 
As an example, a local or national economic downturn would impact a SIB contract designed to 
increase successful job placement rates. This risk is less important in population-based payment 
schemes, as they typically include a comparison or control group that does not receive the 
intervention and serves as a benchmark for success.  
           
Intervention model risk: Intervention model risk can be defined as the risk that the intervention 
model being funded is ineffective and will therefore fail to achieve its desired outcome. In this 
case the investor would not get paid or would take a haircut on the initial investment. Currently, 
this risk is significant because of the uncertainties and lack of agreed-upon standards for the 
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measurement of social outcomes and the difficulty of monetizing social outcomes. While trial 
and error of intervention models is expected to help mitigate this risk, success in one 
geographical area, population, time frame, or social sector cannot directly correlate across 
different projects, which causes uncertainty to persist. Randomized control trials and other 
statistical techniques are currently being used to try to mitigate this risk; though this will 
undoubtedly help, intervention model risk can never be eliminated altogether. 
 
Evaluation risk: Evaluation risk can be defined as the risk that even if the interventional model 
is effective in achieving the desired outcomes, the results are incorrectly evaluated. If the 
evaluation shows that the outcomes were less effective than they actually were, the investor risks 
not getting paid or having to take a haircut on the initial investment. Similar to the intervention 
model risk, evaluation risk is significant because of the uncertainties surrounding the 
measurement of social outcomes. Once again, trial and error and the use of statistical techniques 
may help mitigate this risk, but it cannot be eliminated altogether.    
 
Liquidity risk: Liquidity risk can be defined as the risk investors face when funding a SIB 
contract whose payouts occur over an extended time span. The typical length of a SIB contract is 
four to five years, some last as long as ten. Without a secondary market, investors have no way 
to liquidate their positions in a situation where the opportunity cost of capital would normally 
compel them to do so.  
 
Reputation risk: All players in a SIB are potentially vulnerable to reputational damage should 
the project fail. The service provider and outcome funder (especially if it is a public institution) 
are probably the most directly exposed, but a major controversy could certainly have the 
potential to destroy the public image of everyone involved. A case of mistreatment of clients, 
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corruption, or rigged metrics would certainly affect investors’ image beyond the structure of the 
deal. The only way this risk can be mitigated is for the investor to perform robust due diligence 
of all actors involved in the deal. 
 
Barriers to scale  
 
Transaction costs: Transaction costs can be defined as the costs involved in market exchange. 
More specifically, they refer to the costs of discovering market prices and writing and enforcing 
contracts. Within the SIB market, transaction costs are dominated by the costs incurred for 
intermediary services and technical assistance, evaluation, and legal fees. As an example of the 
high transaction costs related to legal services, according to the Brookings Institute, the 
Massachusetts recidivism SIB required that over 27 contracts be written and over 1,100 legal 
hours billed.15 Further, of the 38 deals that the Brookings Institute analyzed for its study on SIBs, 
deal development ranged from six months to three years. Given the nascent and relatively ad-hoc 
nature of the SIB market, these transaction costs are considered to be extremely high and 
prohibitive for further scaling.  
 
Availability of capital: The availability of private entities willing to invest capital in SIBs 
remains limited. The cause of this limitation is multifactorial. First, the lack of investment 
vehicles and credible financial agents that can be trusted to direct capital flows has greatly 
limited the number of investors exposed to SIBs. Second, investors remain unconvinced that 
significant returns can be made on SIB contracts. Third, minimizing the uncertainty of future 
payments is difficult when deal success depends on public officials’ willingness to structure 
traditional services as SIB contracts while simultaneously facing election cycles. Fourth, payouts 
                                                
15 Brookings Institute, “The Potential and Limitations of Impact Bonds: Lessons from the First Five Years of Experience 
Worldwide,” p. 30 
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can occur over extended time periods, and the lag between service provisioning and knowing 
successful outcomes have been achieved creates uncertainty. Fifth, there are few entities willing 
to play the role of a market maker. Further, since only a small number of contracts currently 
exist, larger financial intermediaries cannot justify trying to establish a first mover advantage by 
taking on the role of a loss leader. This role would then have to be taken on directly by the 
government, a government-sponsored entity, or a philanthropic organization. 
 
Deal flow availability: Deal flow availability generally refers to the amount of available 
investment or business opportunities. In the SIB market, the essential requirement is the 
willingness of the government (outcome funder) to support the specific social service, engage in 
a SIB project, and repay investors. As this market is still in infancy with a limited proven track 
record, many governments are cautious about engaging in the market. On a broader level, 
questions have been raised about the availability of monetizable and easily measurable socially 
desirable outcomes that would be suitable for SIB projects. 
 
Availability of service providers: There are two major barriers related to the availability of 
service providers. Scaling an intervention tends to be a complex, often non-linear process, which 
makes it difficult to assess a priori a provider’s capacity to scale up the project. On a more 
fundamental level, there are few service providers with an established reputation of delivering 
the desired outcomes through SIB projects, and since there is no rating system for providers’ 
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6. High Transaction Costs as the “Binding Constraint” 
 
Having identified the investor risks and barriers to scale, it is now necessary to determine which 
factor presents the biggest challenge for the SIB market’s development. For the purpose of this 
analysis, investor risks will be bucketed into barriers to scale as a constraint on the availability 
of capital. Therefore, the following section will focus exclusively on determining which barrier to 
scale can be considered the “binding constraint” on the SIB market’s development. 
 
Definition of Binding Constraint 
 
Building off of Ricardo Hausmann, Dani Rodrik, and Andrès Velasco’s work in development 
economics, it is vital to understand what the “binding constraints” are for the SIB market’s 
growth. As Hausmann, Rodrik and Velasco have shown, all developing economies face 
significant economic and development challenges. However, certain challenges are more 
restrictive to growth than others, meaning that if these problems are ignored in favor of 
concentration on less restrictive challenges, there might be no (or at best marginal) impact on a 
country’s development. In essence, improvements to a country’s economic development are 
constrained by a binding factor. This is a particularly useful framework in development 
economics, because implementation capacity, political support, and financing are usually scarce. 
 
Binding Constraints Analysis for SIB Market 
 
This framework is helpful when thinking about the numerous challenges the SIB market 
currently faces. As illustrated by Figure 7, respondents to the Brookings Institution survey on 
social impact bonds highlighted 16 challenges in developing the market. Of these 16 challenges, 
9 were cited as a “big challenge” or “somewhat of a challenge” by at least 50% of the 
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Figure 7: Brookings Institution Survey on Challenges in Developing Social Impact Bonds 
 
Whereas in the Hausmann, Rodrik, and Velasco framework governments or funding agencies are 
restricted in their intervention options by implementation capacity, political support, and 
financing, SIB reformers are restricted by research funding, investor and outcome funder 
appetite, and public support. Therefore, while momentum for the SIB market is strong, it is vital 
to identify, prioritize, and address the binding constraints to the market’s development.    
 
By categorizing the Brookings Institution survey responses in Figure 8 into the four overarching 
barriers to scale identified in Section 5, it becomes clear that transaction costs stand out as the 
most widely cited challenge. This response was verified through expert interviews, indicating 






Figure 8: Brookings Institution Survey on Challenges in Developing Social Impact Bonds 
 
As many SIB market commentators point out, transaction costs will be reduced as the market 
grows and develops. As deal flow and deal size increase, transaction costs will inevitably 
become smaller as a percentage of the total investment. However, this assumes that the market 
will be able to scale without first reducing transaction costs. Using the binding constraints 
framework, this appears unlikely, since addressing the other challenges would only produce 
marginal benefits. Thus, it is necessary to prioritize lowering transaction costs and determine the 
most effective way to reduce them.    
 
Applying this logic, the following section analyzes three alternative financing/investment 
products to see how other models have been used to reduce transaction costs and assess whether 
these models can be adapted to create more effective financial mechanisms for SIBs. These 
models include bundled Clean Development Mechanisms, structured financial instruments, and 
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social impact private equity funds. Though the models were picked because of their ability to 
reduce transaction costs, they will also be evaluated for their ability to reduce the additional 




7. Financial Product 1: Bundled Clean Development Mechanism  
 
The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) has for the past decade been a prominent 
international mechanism encouraging private and public investment in greenhouse gas reduction 
in developing countries. Small-scale CDM projects have been bundled into single projects in 
order to increase their profitability and reduce risks to investors. This section will provide an 
overview of the bundled CDM model and its use for small-scale green energy projects, a 
discussion on how the model can be translated into the SIB market, and an assessment of the 
model’s ability to mitigate investor risks and address barriers to scale for SIBs.  
 
Summary of Analysis 
 
Bundled CDM Model’s Ability to Mitigate Investor Risks in Social Impact Bonds: 
Execution	   Intermediary	   Government 
Non-Payment	   Systemic	  
Intervention 
Model	   Evaluation	   Liquidity	   Reputation	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
 









	   	   	   	  
 
Overview of CDM bundling 
The Kyoto Protocol, signed by almost 200 countries as a part of the UNFCC in 1997, established 
quantitative targets for greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions for industrialized economies. These 
countries can meet their targets either through domestic climate change mitigation efforts or 
some of the Kyoto Mechanisms, including the CDM. The CDM allows countries with emission 
reduction commitments to meet part of their reductions abroad, where GHG abatement costs can 
be lower. At the same time, this mechanism is supposed to contribute to the investment in clean 
energy technology and sustainable development in developing countries. The host countries 
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receive certified emission reductions (CERs) for each ton of GHG emissions that can be further 
traded on international carbon markets.  
 
 
However, the traditional design of the CDM has resulted in high transactions costs to individual 
small-scale projects. Despite the efforts to simplify and standardize procedures to develop small-
scale CDMs, project developers still face prohibitive costs related to the development and 
validation of project design documents and the verification and certification of emission 
reductions. Of almost 2,900 projects that have generated credits so far, only about 35% are 
small-scale projects; these are responsible for just under 80 million CERs, which accounts for 
less than 5% of the total.16 As the initial and running costs are mostly fixed and not directly 
related to the size of the emission reduction, the potential return is related; this means that the 
low carbon savings per installation make it difficult for small-scale projects to derive value from 
participating in the CDM. The concern is that small-scale projects have the potential to 
contribute significantly to poverty reduction and sustainable development, particularly in rural 
areas. 
                                                
16 Data from UNEP CDM Pipeline http://www.cdmpipeline.org/ 
Figure 9: CDM project life cycle; Source: Kumar, H., et Al., Bundling 
small-scale CDM projects, UNEP (2004) 
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Figure 10 Structure of a bundled CDM project; Source: Bhardwaj, Nishant, et 
al., A Guide to Bundling Small-scale CDM Projects, (2004) 
Bundling a number of individual small-scale projects into one larger CDM project has been 
proposed as one possible solution to overcome these high transaction costs. As long as the 
portfolio is under the limits defined for small-scale projects, and the projects are of the same 
type, within the same geographical area, at the same stage of development, and bundled by one 



















Problems of small-scale projects 
 
Small-scale projects face several obstacles when searching for CDM financing, some of which 
could be addressed through bundling.  
- Up-front transaction costs: With the exception of the UNFCCC registration fee, small 
projects face similar fixed up-front transaction costs to larger projects, in terms of Project 
Design Document (PDD) elaboration, validation, and installation of monitoring systems. 
These could sum up to $100,000 per project even before it has been successfully 
registered.17 
                                                
17 Spalding-Fecher et al. (2012) Assessing the Impact of the Clean Development Mechanism, p.123 
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- Access to capital: Due to the small expected CDM and non-CDM revenues, it is difficult 
to find sources of finance to cover the up-front costs for small-scale projects. In most 
developing countries, there is also a lack of awareness about the carbon market 
mechanism. Local capital markets have been slow to respond, and the project developers 
often lack the capabilities to finance projects in-house or tap foreign capital markets.18 
- Operational transaction costs: Since small-scale CDMs have significantly smaller 
emission reductions, their running transaction costs, in terms of monitoring, verification, 
and issuance per unit of output can be substantial. In fact, one study found that the current 
prices of CERs (below $1 per ton of CO2) would not even cover operational costs for 
many small projects.19 
- Unpredictability of carbon prices: Given the relatively narrow margins of small-scale 
CDM projects, they tend to be particularly susceptible to volatility of prices and 
revenues. Since they are relatively easy to scale, small-scale projects are often developed 
with a subsequent expansion. However, CERs in recent years have fallen from €12 to 
well below €1, particularly hurting the small-scale projects.20 
- Reputational issues: Usually run by local project developers, small-scale CDM projects 
also lack direct linkages to CER markets and cannot afford additional transaction costs 
related to information provision and negotiation. Thus, they often have to accept lower 





                                                
18 Bhardwaj, Nishant et al., Realising the Potential of Small-scale CDM Projects in India (2004), p.24 
19 Carsten Warnecke et al. (2013) CDM Market Support Study, Ecofys, p.12 
20 Ibid., p. 1, 18 
21 Kumar, H. et al., Bundling small-scale CDM projects, UNEP (2004), p. 15.	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Experience with bundled CDMs 
 
After a relatively slow uptake, around 100 small-scale bundled CDM projects were registered 
and issued by 2014. These projects were mostly located in countries like India, China, Brazil, 
and Mexico – all countries with significant deficiencies in sustainable and affordable energy 
supply, particularly in rural areas.22 A majority of these CDMs bundle together projects in wind, 
solar, biogas, or small-scale hydro innovation, which face high up-front costs, are the most 
suitable for distributed generation and offer relatively easy metering and monitoring 
mechanisms. Although CDM bundles have so far delivered mixed results, there are several 
important observations and lessons that can be drawn from them:  
 
− Establishing a bundle is neither easy nor cheap: Since a bundle consists of small-scale 
projects, it requires an independent bundling organization. This increases the up-front 
transaction costs, especially due to the need to establish administrative and contractual 
systems. Bundled projects usually involve a far higher number of participants than 
standard CDMs, and all contracts and agreements between them have to be incorporated 
into the overall project structure. For instance, one project planning to install solar water 
heater systems in three regions in India was bundled together by a consortium of 22 
individual suppliers, manufacturers, and marketers that had to agree to contractual 
obligations among themselves even before turning to outside actors. The cost and time 
required to reach these individual agreements and contracts can increase the overall up-
front transaction costs significantly. Bundling allows for decreased costs per unit, but 
since higher overall costs are incurred even before the registration is approved, the 
                                                
22 Naik M, Singh A, Unnikrishnan S, Naik N, Nimkar I (2015) Review of Clean Development Mechanism and use of Bundled 
Projects in Small and Medium Scale Enterprises. J Waste Resources 5, p. 184. 
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project developer’s take is exposed to significant risk. The potential value of having a 
bundling institution as early as possible in a project, therefore, is that it can provide 
adequate financial backing and increase the chance that the project will get approved and 
qualify for CERs. 
− It matters who does the bundling: Given the up-front costs and risks involved in 
bundling small-scale projects, the bundling organization plays a vital role in the project’s 
life cycle. If a project is to be successful, the bundling organization needs to have or 
develop skills and capacities specific to the role it wants to carry out. A variety of 
organizations can take on the role of bundlers, as different parts of the CDM project cycle 
require different strengths and capacities. Bundling organizations usually add the greatest 
value in the project development and post-implementation phase, including monitoring, 
verification, and certification. 
Many proposals for bundled projects come from project developers or project 
consultants, as they tend to have experience with project identification and development. 
They also have greater control over and involvement in the project, and thus they are 
more likely to have stronger commitments to the success of the project. Energy efficiency 
and waste management projects are particularly suitable for CDM bundles by project 
developers, as they generate savings, but not direct additional income, (e.g., energy 
generation).23 However, the developers often lack the managerial and financial 
capabilities required to establish contractually robust bundles in the face of high up-front 
transaction costs and insufficient linkages to the carbon finance markets. 
                                                
23 For instance, a bundle of six composting plants in Tamil Nadu in India would deliver an IRR of only 2.7% - in one project 
even a negative one – without revenues from CDMs. 
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Alternatively, the bundled project can originate from manufacturers of essential supplies. 
This has been particularly common in power generation through small-scale biogas, 
solar, and wind equipment. They generally possess strong technical expertise and can 
identify and develop projects, but unless they are a subsidiary of a large multinational 
corporation, they tend to face financial and reputational constraints as well as a lack of 
control in monitoring the project. 
Banks and financial institutions are well positioned to handle the initial financial and risk 
burden and provide the reputation and marketing experience needed to do business in the 
international carbon markets. Moreover, they tend to have managerial and contract design 
expertise. However, they are susceptible to the risk of non-delivery, as they do not have 
direct control over the project and are not directly involved in metering and monitoring.   
Small-scale energy generation and efficiency projects can also be very attractive for 
Energy Service Companies (ESCOs), as these companies tend to have the substantial 
technical expertise required to design, set up, and run power projects. Moreover, they 
usually have experience in measuring and monitoring and are familiar with performance 
contracts. However, ESCOs in the developing countries often lack the necessary financial 
strength and connections to carbon markets.   
− Monitoring and measurement is crucial for the expected savings: It has long been 
expected that the greatest benefits of bundling come from decreased monitoring and 
verification costs per unit. It is therefore unsurprising that thus far most bundled CDM 
projects have involved easily metered activities – particularly energy generation 
connected to the grid. One study estimates that the bundling of metered small-scale 
projects can reduce the ratio of transaction costs to CER revenues from 20% to just under 
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10% for individual projects. However, if the bundled projects are not easily metered, the 
ratio can hike up to above 40%.24 This has to be a crucial consideration in developing the 
project design. Transaction costs increase rapidly if the bundled projects are not easily 
metered and/or cannot use common baseline and monitoring plans. Large geographical 
spread can also become particularly costly for non-metered activities. In order to reduce 
monitoring costs, the bundles should be large, homogeneous, and concentrated. This 
structure, however, increases the associated risk.       
− Risk exposure depends on the structure: Besides transaction cost reduction, risk pooling 
is a central theme in designing CDM bundles. Generally, compared to a single project, a 
bundle of small projects can distribute the risk of failure across several projects while 
receiving the same amount of CERs. Bundling can also reduce default risk due to the 
involvement of a greater number of projects and entrepreneurs. However, the bundle can 
have a large number of parties involved in implementation and financing, with the 
bundler having little direct control over the success – and therefore the CER revenues – 
of the project. For instance, one study of potential CDM bundles in Ghana concluded that 
due to the large number of parties that would need to be involved, no commercial 
enterprise was willing to take on the risk of establishing a bundling organization, as it 
would have very little control over the eventual outcome of the project.25 The bundlers 
could mitigate these risks through combining project activities with similar or related 
projects, such as linking GHG projects with other energy efficiency or technology 
improvement activities. However, in this case the project design would need to address 
                                                
24 Bhardwaj, Nishant et al., A Guide to Bundling Small-scale CDM projects (2005), p.9. 
25 Kumar, H. et al., Bundling small-scale projects, (2004), p. 25.	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the inherent trade-off between the cost benefits and the risks associated with homogeneity 
and geographical concentration of the projects. 
 
How this method could be used in SIB/DIB market 
 
Given the need for homogenous, easily “metered” projects with common baselines and 
monitoring plans, fields with well-established metrics and easy data collection – such as energy, 
employment, and perhaps education – are most suitable for the bundling model. 
 
For instance, the Netherlands’ Buzinezzclub Rotterdam provides coaching and assistance to 
unemployed youth receiving municipal welfare in order to get them into the labor market or back 
to an education program. The payment comes from the municipality and is calculated on the 
basis of savings on social assistance expenditures. Their intervention model appears to have 
worked, with 60-80% of the participants having left social assistance after six months. 26  
 
Having a bundling organization with a regional or even national scope could prove useful for the 
expansion of the project, particularly in terms of attracting capital, due to the benefits of risk-
pooling and enhanced monitoring and evaluation capabilities. In this case the bundling 
organization could be a financial intermediary, and it could identify similar initiatives to bundle 
or facilitate expansion into other large municipalities facing similar challenges. Having a pool of 
projects would decrease the risk of failure, since it is less likely that all current cohorts in all 
municipalities will not succeed. Moreover, it could facilitate the process of establishing common 
baseline and contract structures across the projects. If an established institution is involved, it 
could also bring a reputational advantage.  
                                                




Nevertheless, such expansion and streamlining could limit the flexibility of experimenting with 
the intervention and the original focus of the project developer (which in the case of 
Buzinezzclub Rotterdam was not interested solely in reducing youth unemployment, but also on 
participants’ subsequent entrepreneurial activity). Moreover, the bundler would have very little 
control over the eventual outcome of individual projects. The success of this model in the SIB 







8. Financial Product 2: Structured Financial Instruments 
 
 
Structured financial instruments (SFIs) are products widely used across asset classes that allow 
for standardized methods of evaluating the risk and effective distribution of risk-to-return ratios 
through derivatization and market segmentation. While the SIB market could rapidly scale if an 
SFI model were applied, it would greatly lessen the potential areas of social service where SIBs 
could be implemented. The success of an SFI model would require that either governments or 
ratings agencies take on the responsibility of being clearinghouses for SIBs; it would also 
require outcome payers to provide credit insulation in order to ensure liquidity and establish a 
floor for assessing a SIB’s value. 
 
Summary of Analysis 
 
SFI Model’s Ability to Mitigate Investor Risks in Social Impact Bonds: 
Execution Intermediary Government 
Non-Payment Systemic 
Intervention 
Model Evaluation Liquidity Reputation 
        
 
SFI Model’s Ability to Address Barriers for Scale for Social Impact Bonds: 
Transaction 






    
 
 
Overview of SFI Model 
Structured financial instruments have proven to be effective tools in growing markets within 
asset classes where complexity and small individual deal sizes have traditionally prevented 
development. Collateralized bond obligations, collateralized debt obligations, and syndicated 
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loans represent the most common types of SFIs. These instruments succeed because they are able 
to increase the size of deals to make them suitable for large-scale investors to consider investing 
capital. SFIs accomplish this through several means. 
 
1. SFIs are able to impose the standardization of securities to such a degree that they can be 
bundled.  
 
2. SFIs are able to stratify risk in order to attract different types of investors who have variable 
investor-risk profiles. In order to prevent an entity from being incentivized by deal-volume rather 
than accurate risk measurement, referred to as “moral hazard,” risk stratification requires a third-
party entity whose ability to provide an assessment of risks is trusted within the market (e.g., 
credit rating agencies for bonds).  
 
3.  SFIs are able to create liquidity in otherwise illiquid assets. The standardization of securities 
allows for consistent modeling and projection of future revenues. This results in the growth of 
secondary markets, which provide investors with the flexibility they need to alter their portfolio. 
 
How to Apply the Model for SIBs – A Government-Backed SIB Market 
 
Standardization of SIB contracts 
 
The UK’s experience with SIBs has shown that SIB contracts can be standardized in some cases. 
As an example, the Department for Work and Pensions has created a standardized rate card 
(Figure 2) that they use across multiple SIB contracts, considerably decreasing the transaction 
cost of each deal. The level of standardization necessary for the SFI model to work would be 
higher than the proposed CDM model above. Payments would need to come at predictable times, 
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and the number of potential payouts would need to be limited to ensure consistency across 
contracts. This would eliminate projects that have payouts on a per-individual basis, and instead 
would rely on population-based outcomes such as an overall percentage decrease in recidivism. 
The number of measurable outcomes would also need to be limited to allow for better prediction 
of the relative worth of the SIB at its “coupon” payment points.  
 
One of the assumed societal benefits of SIBs, their capacity to help implement innovative 
interventions that governments would otherwise be reluctant to try, would be greatly curtailed in 
a SFI-SIB model. In this model, only well-studied interventions with known track records of 
success could be considered for implementation. Therefore, the SFI-SIB market would consist of 
financing for programs that outcomes payers would consider implementing themselves if they 
were not constrained. The reason for this constraint could be financial or political. As an 
example, some social interventions in the U.S. would be more financially cost-effective in the 
aggregate, but are limited because cost-savings would be shared between local, state, and federal 
government entities. The need for budgetary coordination across multiple levels of bureaucracy 
prohibitively raises the transactional cost barrier. 
 
A high level of standardization is necessary in order to stratify risk within an individual SIB 
contract. By classifying risk in a predictable way, bundling would allow for the creation of “risk 
tranches” that could guarantee a rate of return on investment as a percentage rather than a 
monetary payout. A payout ceiling based on a percentage of estimated cost-savings would be set 
to ensure this payment structure is not exploited by “over-investment.” As the market grows, SIB 
contracts would open up for competitive bidding, with the contract going to the service provider 
who has the lowest estimated capital needs and proof of access to a source of credit. 
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Additionally, instead of all investors earning the same payout based on an outcome (as in the 
example in Figure 1), they would have the option of investing in any level of outcome while 
seeing an escalating rate of return for purchasing a “higher social-impact performance tranche” 
of bundled SFI-SIBs. 
 
One major benefit of this system is that it would create separate markets that more closely align 
with the various reasons why investors are interested in SIBs. As an example, philanthropic 
organizations interested in encouraging the growth of SFI-SIBs (market makers) could 
specifically invest in low-return tranches with the intention of repeated reinvestment. 
Simultaneously, investors searching for non-concessionary returns could invest in higher-impact 
tranches.  
 
The SFI-SIB Market 
 
In the SFI-SIB market, a central clearinghouse would serve both to assess the merits of SIB 
contracts and act as a repository for requests for service provision from various levels of 
government. The benefit of government involvement is that it could verify each SIB contract’s 
estimated cost-savings using administrative budgeting data and publically disseminate the 
results. The public release of this information would help orient the SFI-SIB market and signal to 
potential service providers the capacity needed to participate in these contracts. 
 
The relative worth of SFI-SIBs will initially be difficult to estimate. A government will need to 
facilitate this process by guaranteeing that investors can offload their positions by selling their 
SFI-SIB assets at a discount to the government. The amount discounted will be weighted based 
on the maturities of the SIBs included in the SFI, with SIBs closer to maturity being more 
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heavily discounted. Such a mechanism will incentivize closer scrutiny of the SIBs by investors 
as they progressively bear more of the risk. Turning SFI-SIBs into diminishing government-
backed securities will enable a secondary market to grow as concerns about liquidity and SIB 
valuation are significantly decreased. In the event of the government buying the SFI-SIB 
position, it then has the potential to be subsequently resold with the outcomes payments reduced 
by a percentage reflective of the government discount. An additional benefit of this arrangement 
is that it would allow for a SFI-SIB presumed to be failing to be “rescued” by another investor or 






Execution (Service Provider) Risk: The SFI-SIB model does little to impact execution risk. This 
model takes a market-based approach to assessing the capabilities of service providers. It does 
not provide either a regulatory framework or mechanism for alleviating this risk beyond waiting 
for service providers to establish track records of success that could then be used to judge their 
operations.  
 
Intermediary Risk: The SFI-SIB model provides some decreases in intermediary risk, mostly 
through decreasing the number of roles necessary. The SFI-SIB market-based approach with a 
central clearinghouse eliminates the need for additional intermediaries related to the assessment 
and origination of contracts, as the contracts are certified by a single agent and then bid on by 
service providers. Financial intermediaries would only need to focus on the bundling of 
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standardized contracts and calculating a composite rate of return for a SFI-SIB. Still, this model 
does little to specifically align the interests of intermediaries with potential conflicts of interest. 
 
Government Non-payment: The SFI-SIB model envisions that these instruments would need to 
be backed by depreciating government guarantees in order to promote growth and foster a 
secondary market. This adds an additional liability to the government without lessening the 
initial concerns associated with government non-payment. 
 
Systemic: The SFI-SIB model does nothing to alleviate systemic risk, and in its initial stages 
could exacerbate systemic risk, because of the lack of diversity in SIB contracts necessary to 
achieve standardization.  
 
Intervention Model: Intervention model risk would be greatly decreased, but at the cost of 
project diversity. Only limited categories of interventions (e.g., healthcare and recidivism) could 
feasibly result in the very large reductions in social services costs necessary to drive the SFI-SIB 
market. Intervention models would be limited to those with proven track records of success, 
where governments are incapable of budgeting appropriate resources to fund them directly. 
 
Evaluation: No obvious benefit from the SFI-SIB model. 
 
Liquidity: Liquidity risk is greatly reduced in the SFI-SIB model. This occurs because of the 
depreciating government-backed guarantees on capital investment, which allow for the effective 
pricing of instruments and the creation of a secondary market. This would allow investors to 
immediately withdraw their positions should that become necessary. 
 
Reputation: No obvious benefit from the SFI-SIB model. 
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Barriers to Scale 
 
Transaction Costs: One strength of the SFI-SIB model is the substantial reduction in transaction 
costs. This reduction is accomplished by eliminating the need for some intermediary roles 
through the standardization of contracts and a decrease in the number and relative risk of 
interventions available to service providers to implement. 
 
Availability of Capital: The availability of capital would increase substantially if the SFI-SIB 
model were implemented. This is because much of the risk from engaging in the SFI-SIB market 
is “insured” by turning SIBs into government-backed assets. This results in a transfer of the risks 
of poor performance from investors onto the government. 
 
Deal Flow Availability: No obvious benefit from the SFI-SIB model. 
 
Availability of Service Providers: A SFI-SIB model would lead to a decrease in the number of 
possible service providers participating in the SIB space. This is because the standardization of 
contracts and limited number of viable intervention models would cause increasing economies of 
scale. The deal sizes necessary to interest large-scale investors would create pressure to design 





9. Financial Product 3: Impact Investing Private Equity Model 
 
While the private equity model is widely used by the impact investing community, it has yet to be 
fully adopted as an investment vehicle for SIBs. The following section will provide an overview 
of the private equity model and its use in impact investing, key trends in the private equity impact 
investing market, a discussion and case study on how the private equity model can be used for 
SIBs, and an evaluation of the private equity model’s ability to mitigate investor risks and 
address barriers to scale for SIBs. 
 
Summary of Analysis 
 
Private Equity Model’s Ability to Mitigate Investor Risks in Social Impact Bonds: 
Execution Intermediary Government 
Non-Payment Systemic 
Intervention 
Model Evaluation Liquidity Reputation 
        
 









    
 
 
Overview of Private Equity Model 
 
The private equity, or fund manager, model is a well-established investment vehicle in the US. 
Catering toward institutional investors, it is structured as a partnership whereby fund managers 
(general partners) pool capital from investors (limited partners) in order to invest in private 
businesses. The fund managers attempt to generate value in the portfolio companies by 
employing hands-on project management, using their network of specialists, and actively 
monitoring performance. In addition, investors usually hold seats on the fund board of directors, 
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and they can contribute expertise and decision-making skills to investment decisions and 
portfolio management. Financial returns are then realized when the investments are successfully 
exited at higher valuations than they had when they were first acquired.  
 
Impact Investing Experience with Private Equity Model 
 
Impact investing is an investment approach that targets both financial returns and the creation of 
social and/or environmental good. It is not an asset class, but rather a strategy, meaning that 
investments are made across various asset classes. It is usually employed by specialized fund 
managers that have a wide range of investment mandates and strategies. For example, impact 
investment funds can target certain locations, economic sectors, social themes, or asset classes. 
In addition, fund managers or individual funds can be divided into three categories based on their 
investment objectives: 1) financial first, 2) impact first, or 3) double bottom line.  
 
Key Trends in the Impact Investing Market 
 
− Rapid Growth: The social impact investment market began to take off in the early 1990s, 
and since then it has seen impressive growth in both the level of invested capital and the 
number of new funds. According to the OECD, by 2012 there was roughly $40 billion of 
total capital in the social impact investment market, with approximately 350 new funds 
being established.27 While this is small compared to the total amount of global managed 
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Figure 11: Cumulative number of impact investment funds worldwide, 1970-2012, Source: OECD p. 5 
  
− Strong Financial Success: While the perception that market rate-seeking social impact 
funds produce concessionary returns still exists, recent studies have shown that social 
impact funds have performed well compared to the comparative universe of traditional 
private equity funds. According to Cambridge Associates and Global Impact Investing 
Network, who in 2015 created the Impact Investing Benchmark, “In aggregate, impact 
investment funds launched between 1998 and 2004 – those that are largely realized – 
have outperformed funds in a comparative universe of conventional [private investment] 
funds.”28 Further, the Wharton Social Impact Initiative recently conducted a study 
showing that market rate-seeking funds have not had to make concessions to financial 
returns in order to preserve the portfolio companies’ missions.29  
 
− Strong Future Prospects: According to the World Economic Forum, over the next 40 
years Generation X and the Millennial Generation will inherit an estimated $41 trillion 
                                                
28 “Introducing the Impact Investing Benchmark,” Cambridge Associates and Global Impact Investing Network (GIIN), 2015, p.1 
29 Gray, Jacob, Ashburn, Nick Douglas, Harry and Jeffers, Jessica, supervised by Musto, David and Geczy, Christopher, “Great 
Expectations: Mission Preservation and Financial Performance in Impact Investing,” The Wharton Social Impact Initiative of the 
University of Pennsylvania (WSII), 7 Oct. 2015, p. 4	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from the Baby Boomer Generation. In addition, a recent study by Deloitte showed that 
Millennials ranked “to improve society” as the number one priority of business.30 This 
implies that the emerging generation of investors will likely seek out investment 
opportunities that achieve both social and financial objectives, signaling strong prospects 
for the social impact investment market.  
 
− Difficulty Attracting Institutional Investors: While the impact investing market has 
exhibited strong growth, financial success, and future prospects, it has still had difficulty 
attracting institutional investors. Key barriers have included: 1) difficulty assessing the 
risk/reward profile of impact investments due to a lack of performance indicators; 2) the 
expected trade-off between profit and purpose, which can restrict liability constrained 
investors; 3) the lack of agreed-upon standards for measuring and reporting social impact, 
making it difficult for investors to compare different funds; 4) a small pipeline of impact 
investment opportunities; and 5) a lack of mainstream intermediaries.31 
  
How to Apply the Model for SIBs: The Bridges Ventures Social Impact Bond Fund 
 
While impact investment private equity funds are familiar with investments in more traditional 
asset classes such as socially oriented businesses or real estate, they have yet to develop an 
appetite for SIBs. The one exception is Bridges Ventures, which in April 2013 launched the 
Bridges Social Impact Bond Fund. To date, this is the first and only private equity fund focusing 




                                                
30 “From the Margins to the Mainstream: Assessment of the Impact Investment Sector and Opportunities to Engage Mainstream 
Investors,” World Economic Forum Investors Industries and Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, Sept. 2013, p. 5 
31 ibid p. 23-26	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Bridges Ventures Overview  
 
Founded in 2002, Bridges Ventures is an impact fund manager focused on four main themes: 
Underserved Markets, Health & Well-being, Education & Skills and Sustainable Living. In order 
to achieve scale and impact in these four sectors, Bridges Ventures has developed a wide variety 
of funds that differ in terms of the asset classes and the level of risk-adjusted financial returns 
they generate. This is meant to draw a wide variety of investors by offering products with 
varying degrees of financial and impact return expectations. As of December 2015, Bridges 
Ventures had over £500m in funds under management. 
 
The Bridges Social Impact Bond Fund Overview  
 
Launched in April 2013 with seed capital from Big Society Capital, Omidyar Network, 
Panahpur, and a co-investment agreement with the Bridges Social Entrepreneurs Fund, The 
Bridges Social Impact Bond Fund seeks to provide financing for charities and social enterprises 
in the UK. It is structured as a ten-year close-ended fund, requiring that all investments be made 
within the first four years of its launch. So far, it has invested in 14 SIBs that span across six 
social sectors, including: 1) Prevention of Youth Unemployment; 2) Preventing Entry into Care; 
3) Supported Adoption; 4) Therapeutic Fostering; 5) Homelessness Support for Young People; 
and 6) Social Prescribing for Patients with Long-Term Conditions. The fund will make 
investments for up to £3 million, and must be structured as an outcomes-funded intervention 
program. Since its inception the fund has expanded its investor base, and now includes 
investments from the European Investment Fund, Greater Manchester Pension Fund, Merseyside 
Pension Fund, Deutsche Bank, the Prince of Wales’s Charitable Foundation, Trust for London 




Early Successes of The Bridges Social Impact Bond Fund 
 
In 2015 the first three of Bridges Ventures’ 14 SIBs completed their contracts, all delivering 
positive outcomes. Two of these SIBs, Career Connect and Teens and Toddlers, produced social 
outcomes above their desired targets and have been recommissioned for a second iteration. 
Given these SIBs’ strong successes, investors were able to generate positive financial returns. 
 
Key Learnings from The Bridges Social Impact Bond Fund 
 
Previously, SIBs have largely been valued for their ability to fund innovative new interventions 
with little or no track record. However, Bridge Ventures has seen that SIBs can generate 
significant value by improving existing government programs, correcting perverse incentives 
created by previous policy, better coordinating multiple stakeholders involved in a project, and 
unlocking future cashable savings by investing larger amounts of capital up front. If this 
knowledge were to be applied to the SIB market, SIBs would move from a model focused on 
innovation to one focused on helping outcome funders achieve better results in policy areas 
where they already have targeted spends. 
 
With regards to intermediaries, this model would mean that they would evolve from market 
makers to co-investors/advisors focused on one side of the market. As Bridges Ventures has 
found, this model has reduced intermediary risk by preventing conflicts of interest, and it has 
reduced intervention model and execution risk by improving project efficiency and better 
utilizing previous project learnings. Importantly, this evolution would still allow outcome 
funders to leverage the flexibility and increased access to service providers generated by SIBs 










Execution (Service Provider) Risk: The private equity model should help to mitigate execution 
risk significantly. In the traditional private equity space, fund managers have been successful 
because of their ability to add value to portfolio investments through an active, hands-on 
management approach. This has translated well into the impact investment space, as fund 
managers have proven successful in generating both social and financial value on their 
investments. Importantly, they have gained valuable experience in monitoring ventures’ progress 
toward their impact goals and making strategic interventions when necessary. This indicates that 
the capacity for fund managers to help social service providers successfully implement their 
intervention models already exists. 
 
In addition, limited partners are often on the fund advisory board of private equity funds. This 
allows investors with relevant experience to contribute to the fund’s portfolio management, 
creating more value-add opportunities and helping to ensure effective intervention model 
execution. 
 
Intermediary Risk: Under the current model, intermediaries act more as project advisors/market 
makers and operate on a fee-based structure. Fee structures vary widely, and often include 
closing fees, technical assistance fees, performance management fees, and/or success fees. While 
the inclusion of success fees is meant to align incentives between the investor and the 
intermediary, individual deal structures vary, meaning that success fees can account for a large, 
small, or non-existent part of the fee structure. This leaves open the possibility of intermediary 




The private equity model should significantly reduce intermediary risk by better aligning 
incentives between the intermediary and the investor. Fund managers usually earn money in 
three ways: 1) management fees, 2) co-investment earnings, and 3) carried interest. While 
management fees do play a role in the fee structure, the majority of earnings for the fund 
manager come from the co-investments and carried interest. Thus, fees are heavily skewed 
toward deal success rather than deal origination. This should help align incentives and mitigate 
much of the intermediary risk.  
 
Government Non-Payment Risk: No obvious benefit from the private equity model. 
 
Systemic Risk: No obvious benefit from the private equity model. 
 
Intervention Model Risk: Similar to the way the private equity model could reduce the execution 
risk for SIBs, there is significant potential to leverage the pre-investment evaluation capabilities 
of impact investment fund managers to reduce intervention model risk. Impact investment fund 
managers have proven adept at achieving their desired financial and social impact objectives, 
indicating a strong ability to evaluate intervention models. In the current impact investment fund 
space, this translates into the evaluation of a business model based on its potential to both 
generate financial returns and achieve social impact. This differs little from the evaluation of a 
service provider model’s potential to achieve social impact. Thus, by using the preexisting 
evaluation capacity, fund managers should be able to mitigate much of the intervention model 
risk in the SIB market.   
 
Evaluation Risk: Given that independent third-party evaluations will continue to be necessary, 




Liquidity Risk: While the private equity model does open the possibility of enhanced liquidity for 
investors, a significant reduction in liquidity risk would require a robust secondary market for 
fund shares. In the traditional private equity space, liquidity has been increased via publicly 
traded funds and the proliferation of fund-of-fund investment vehicles. While this is beginning to 
materialize in the impact investment space through the growth of social impact-focused 
government or quasi-government fund-of-funds, a liquid market is still in its infancy.     
 
Reputation Risk: Since SIB contracts will be attached to the fund manager, rather than directly to 
the investor, reputation risk should be reduced for the investor. This assumes that the investor is 
not required to reveal their investments due to regulation or that the investor does not voluntarily 
reveal their investments. 
 
Barriers to Scale 
 
Transaction Costs: One of the most important benefits of the private equity model is that it can 
reduce transaction costs involved with SIBs. The model has already proven capable of lowering 
these costs for traditional private equity and social impact investment, helping to scale those 
markets significantly.  
 
For the SIB market, the private equity fund structure can reduce transaction costs in four main 
ways. First, it reduces the amount of marketing and capital raising required by the intermediaries. 
Instead of having to match an investor and a project for every deal, the fund manager will only 
have to raise capital once. Second, by pooling projects into a fund, the fund manager should be 
able to more easily monitor and evaluate each SIB. It should be easier for intermediaries to 
benchmark across a portfolio and develop best practice techniques for operational management. 
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This would be particularly effective in funds that are dedicated to a specific location or social 
sector. Third, there would be no need to build the intermediary infrastructure from the ground up. 
Instead, fund managers can leverage their expertise in monitoring, evaluating, and providing 
strategic operational management to social impact interventions built through experience with 
the more mature social impact investment market. This would eliminate the growing pains and 
learning curve currently faced by the advisory intermediaries. Fourth, this structure would reduce 
the time and effort required for coordination between the various actors involved in the SIB. This 
would eliminate the need to include the investor in every contract negotiation, reducing the 
number of actors involved and the amount of time allocated for technical assistance advisory. 
 
Availability of Capital: The private equity model should be effective in increasing the 
availability of capital for SIBs by attracting institutional investors. Currently, SIB investors tend 
to be high net-worth individuals or foundations. Institutional investors, which have by far the 
biggest share of investible capital, have largely been excluded from the SIB market because of 
the small deal size, unfamiliarity with intermediaries, and for the liability-constrained investors, 
fiduciary responsibility.  
 
The private equity model substantially lowers these barriers to investment in several ways. First, 
by combining SIBs into a fund, institutional investors will be able to access investment 
opportunities large enough to justify the due diligence and performance management necessary 
for each investment. Second, institutional investors will be more comfortable with the 
intermediaries and financing mechanisms because they are familiar with the fund manager 
model. Currently, the market is made of up specialized, relatively young, advisor-style 
intermediaries. While high net-worth individuals and foundations are more comfortable in this 
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environment, institutional investors have no experience working with either the intermediary 
model or the current actors; given the financial first mandate for institutional investors, this has 
deterred many from investing in SIBs. By utilizing a familiar intermediary model with the 
potential for well-known and established actors to be involved, the market should be able to 
attract institutional investment.  
 
While many regulators have yet to clarify whether impact investment is consistent with fiduciary 
responsibility, momentum is building. There is increasing recognition that impact investment 
funds are able to produce non-concessionary returns, as shown by the recent Wharton Social 
Impact Initiative and Cambridge Associates/Global Impact Investing Network studies. As the 
World Economic Forum points out: “In instances when there is no expected trade-off, certain 
liability-constrained investors are beginning to allocate capital to impact investments.” Given 
that institutional investors mainly access impact investment opportunities through investment 
funds, this indicates that institutional investors are becoming more comfortable with impact 
investment funds. By moving toward a private equity model, SIBs can leverage a model that is 
becoming accepted as being compatible with fiduciary responsibility. 
 
It is important to recognize, however, that unless a robust secondary market for pay-for-
performance funds is created, the private equity model risks making SIBs inaccessible to retail 
investors. This is because most funds require minimum investment requirements, which are 
generally too large for retail investors.    
  
Deal Flow Availability: No obvious benefit from the private equity model.  
 
Availability of Service Providers: No obvious benefit from the private equity model.  
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10. Recommendations for Investors and Policymakers to Help Scale the 
SIB Market 
 
Given the analysis presented above, it is clear that in order to scale SIBs, the market must move 
from a market maker, advisory-style intermediary model to a fund manager intermediary model. 
This market would utilize the pre-existing impact investment private equity infrastructure, but 
would incorporate SIBs as a new investable asset class. While the development of this market 
will be largely organic and driven mainly by the success of early adopters such as Bridges 
Ventures, there are certain actions that both policymakers and investors can take to help spur its 
development. The following section will present a non-comprehensive list of recommended 
action steps.   
 
How can investors/intermediaries help promote this model? 
 
− Advance industry standards for measurement and reporting of SIB fund impact. 
Significant work has been done to create uniform measurement and reporting standards 
for impact investing funds through the development of the Global Impact Investing 
Ratings System (GIIRS). This is meant to help intermediaries and investors benchmark 
and monitor fund performance, evaluate investment opportunities, and reduce transaction 
costs involved with due diligence and marketing. While GIIRS has focused on the more 
traditional impact investing asset classes, if it were expanded to include SIB programs, 
service providers, and/or funds, it could help make SIBs a more easily targeted asset class 
for fund managers.       
− Make financial returns and impact data transparent for SIB investments. While many 
intermediaries view their return data as proprietary, the lack of transparency will make it 
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difficult for investors to evaluate the risks and opportunities involved with investing in 
SIB funds. If first-mover fund managers were to report their social and financial returns 
transparently, “brand-name” intermediaries would be more likely to recommend or invest 
in SIB-focused funds, and institutional investors would be better able to compare, rank, 
and classify different fund managers. In the nascent stages of the SIB fund market, this 
transparency will be particularly important for the market to scale. 
− Have “brand name” intermediaries develop, co-manage, or pool funds with impact 
investment fund managers. This will help to attract institutional investors and will bring 
strong financial expertise to the SIB fund market.  
− Offer wide-ranging product types. It is important for SIB fund managers to offer a 
diverse range of investment opportunities, including funds that are categorized by asset 
class, geography, social sector, return target, and/or fund size. This will open the market 
to different types of investors with different constraints or investment goals. In addition, 
fund managers will be able to leverage the capabilities and expertise generated by 
focused fund types, thereby reducing some of the investor risks such as execution, 
intermediary, and intervention model risk.  
  
How can policymakers help promote this model? 
 
− Implement tax incentives to create favorable net returns for SIB fund investors. In 
2014, the U.K. enacted the Social Investment Tax Relief (SITR). SITR provides a range 
of income and capital gains tax reliefs that can be claimed by individual investors for 
investments made in social enterprises with the goal of helping people and communities. 
According to the Cabinet Office guidance note, “Individuals making an eligible 
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investment can deduct 30% of the cost of their investment from their income tax liability, 
either for the tax year in which the investment is made or the previous tax year (if 
2014/15 or later). The investment must be held for a minimum period of 3 years for the 
relief to be retained.” Importantly, investments in companies set up to carry out a SIB are 
eligible for SITR. A similar tax incentive in the U.S. could be instrumental in catalyzing a 
SIB fund market and helping it to establish proof of concept.  
  
− Create funding mechanisms that add liquidity to the market, for example through a 
fund-of-fund structure. In the UK, the government helped establish Big Society Capital 
as an impact investing wholesaler, or a fund-of-funds that invests in socially focused 
intermediaries. While it is now operating independently, it was originally established 
through government-directed seed funding from dormant bank accounts in the UK. Big 
Society Capital has proven vital in supporting innovative social impact intermediaries 
and played a key role in the establishment of the Bridges Ventures Social Impact Bond 
Fund. This structure could play a similar role in the US, which could help establish a SIB 
fund market during its infancy.       
 
− Take a subordinate position as a co-investor in SIB projects. In his FY17 budget, 
President Obama proposed a one-time mandatory appropriation of $300 million for a new 
Pay for Success (PFS) fund within the Department of the Treasury. This would be used to 
help local and state governments provide funding for SIB projects. A similar allocation 
could be used to co-invest alongside SIB funds in certain qualified projects. This would 
be particularly useful if the government were to take a subordinate position in the 




− Clarify fiduciary responsibility mandates for liability-constrained institutional investors 
to allow for investments in SIB funds. This could significantly enhance the SIB fund 
market’s access to capital and bring the oversight and expertise of sophisticated investors 
to the market. 
 
− Support a uniform measurement and evaluation system for SIB funds/service 
providers. By officially endorsing a measurement and evaluation system, or even 
mandating that results be reported through a specific system, policymakers could enhance 
transparency and create uniformity in the market. Similar to the potential effects of the 
GIIRS, this could help intermediaries and investors benchmark and monitor fund 
performance, evaluate investment opportunities, and reduce transaction costs involved 
with due diligence and marketing.   
 
General recommendations for policymakers to scale SIBs 
 
− Improve data-sharing agreements between government agencies at the national and 
subnational level in order to reduce transaction costs, build expertise across governments, 
and facilitate efficient deal flow. 
− Reduce government non-payment risks for SIBs through the creation of dedicated trusts 
or escrow accounts. This could be modeled after the Massachusetts Social Innovation 
Financing Trust, which was set up to ensure that investors get paid if a deal produces 
desired results even if the state’s priorities change. 




− Provide credit guarantees for qualified investments to mitigate potential losses of 
principal. 
− Increase support and investment for capacity building on the state and local level in order 
to make potential outcome funders more comfortable working with SIBs. 
− Provide research and fellowship to SIB-focused university programs to improve 
academic technical assistance. 




Appendix A: Standard Questions for Semi-Structured Interviews 
 
Review of SIB Successes/Failures 
 
• What are the requirements for success? What has proven to be successful so far? 
• What are the limits to growth? What barriers/risks are slowing the growth and success of 
SIBs? 
• How have other financial products managed similar risk profiles? (e.g., sovereign 
guarantees in FDI / sovereign guarantees in project finance, sovereign debt instruments, 
political risk insurance, arbitration/mediation) 
• Are there inherent differences in the domestic/international markets for SIBs? If so, what 
makes them different and how can we work around the differences to standardize the 
products? 
• How have we judged success thus far? Has perception of failure been due to skewed 
expectations or real failure to achieve social impact? 
 
Lessons Learned for Issuers/Investors and Policy Recommendations for Policymakers 
 
• How can policymakers structure the regulatory environment to best protect investors and 
recipient governments, as well as to promote the development of the SIB market? 
• How can the products be structured to minimize risks and improve performance? How 
can incentives be aligned in a sustainable way? 
• How can issuers maximize performance and reduce risks involved? 
 
Next Steps for Standardization  
 
• What areas and programs (e.g., recidivism, school enrollment, visiting prenatal care 
nursing, energy incentives, etc.) have the greatest amount of evidence for success (and 
therefore lower risk for return)? 
• What areas and programs have the lowest implementation costs with regard to human 
capital and expertise (complexity of the intervention)? 
• What areas and programs use the most similar metrics for success across multiple 
contracts? 
• What is the role technology can play in increasing standardization and decreasing 
transaction costs? 
• What transactional barriers represent the greatest limitations to scale? 
• How have other “bundled” financial products been structured in a way that minimizes 
transaction costs and enhances operational efficiency? 
  
Questions for financial firms 
 
• How have financial intermediaries and/or investment firms been able to effectively 
evaluate and monitor a complex network of projects in an investment fund? In your 
experience, what strategies have proven effective/ineffective? 
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• How do firms scale up their investment portfolios in open/close-ended funds? Do you 
think these strategies could be used for a SIB/DIB fund? 
• In the context of the work that you do, and given your understanding of SIBs/DIBs, do 
you think that financial intermediaries/investment firms could build the capacity to 
effectively evaluate, monitor, and actively manage SIB/DIB funds? What would make 
these funds different from pre-existing investment fund models? Where could there be 
overlap or synergies?  
 
 
 
